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THE CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN
GENOCIDE: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA
AND YUGOSLAVIA GOT IT WRONG, AND
WHY IT MATTERS
DANIEL M. GREENFIELD*
Jurists at the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
have erroneously determined that "complicity in genocide" is identical to
"aiding and abetting" genocide. Accordingly, they theorize that complicity
in genocide is not a crime itself, but merely a misplaced and superfluous
liability provision for the crime of genocide. In reality, the two crimes are
distinct and designed to capture very different perpetrators. One guilty of
aiding and abetting genocide had as his very purpose the facilitation of the
commission of genocide. A perpetrator of the crime of complicity in
genocide, in contrast, may not have had genocide as his purpose. Instead,
genocide may merely have been the foreseeable result of his actions. As
such, one found guilty of aiding and abetting genocide must have the
heightened, and difficult to establish, mens rea of the genocidaire-what I
term the "specific intent specific motive nexus." By comparison, one guilty
of complicity in genocide need not have this heightened mens rea. Instead,
a lesser mens rea such as malice or what I term the "specific intent without
specific motive," should suffice to attach guilt. Failure to appreciate this
difference creates a gaping loophole in international criminal law,
providing unwarranted sanctuary to those who enable genocide.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide1 (Genocide Convention) arose from the ashes of the Holocaust.
J.D. 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Northwestern University Professors David Scheffer and Bridget Arimond for their
invaluable guidance and assistance.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
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Born of revulsion at the almost incomprehensible scale and success of the
German campaign to exterminate European Jews and of collective guilt for
the failure to prevent what was ultimately preventable, the Genocide
Convention held great promise. Developed under the aegis of the United
Nations, the Genocide Convention was a virtual codification of the "Never
Again" ethos. Indeed, given the clear prohibitions and equally clear
responsibilities contained within the Convention, one could have believed
at the time that genocide was a thing of the past.
Unfortunately, the past sixty years have not been kind to the promise
of the Genocide Convention. As evidenced by the campaigns of slaughter
in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and now Darfur, genocide,
rather than being relegated to the history books, has become only more
common in the years since the ratification of the Genocide Convention.
The slogan "Never Again" seems quaint and idealistic; indeed, "Again and
Again" might more accurately characterize the years that have passed since
the Genocide Convention was adopted. The reasons for this failure are
many, including naked political calculations, imperfect knowledge,
deference to sovereignty, and isolationism.2  However, political
explanations do not tell the entire story. It is true that ex ante
considerations have often left nations reluctant to intervene in order to
prevent genocide from occurring. However, the ex post judicial responses
once genocide has occurred have been perhaps equally fatal to the promise
of the Genocide Convention.3
The Genocide Convention and the international criminal tribunals
enacted to give force to its provisions, including the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 4 (ICTY) and the International Criminal
2 See generally SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE (2002) (detailing the United States' unwillingness to intervene to prevent
genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES (2000) (exploring the application of
international law to the prevention of genocide); Matthew Lippman, The 1948 Convention
on Genocide: 45 Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 [hereinafter 1948 Convention]
(reviewing the successes and failures of the genocide convention on its forty-fifth
anniversary); Matthew Lippman, The Genocide Convention: Fifty Years Later, 15 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 415 [hereinafter Fifty Years Later] (reviewing the successes and failures of
the genocide convention on its fiftieth anniversary); David Scheffer, Genocide and Atrocity
Crimes, 1 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 229 (considering obstacles to successful genocide
prosecutions).
3 See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 70, 415, 424 (Feb. 26)
(absolving Serbia of direct responsibility for genocide and complicity in genocide committed
against Bosnian civilians during the 1995 Srebrenica massacre).
4 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
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Tribunal for Rwanda 5 (ICTR), have twin purposes: to prevent genocide and
failing that, to punish genocide.6 Because the international community has
largely been unable to prevent genocide through ex ante measures,
prevention may ultimately only be achieved through the deterrent force of
punishment. During the past fourteen years, the ICTY and ICTR have
carried out the first significant post-Genocide Convention attempts to
punish the perpetrators of genocide. These ad hoc Tribunals have played a
critical role in responding to the crime of genocide. For the first time since
Nuremberg, perpetrators of genocide have been brought before the
international community and held accountable for their crimes.7 Moreover,
the ad hoc Tribunals have developed a significant body of legal precedent
with respect to the crime of genocide that is now available to future
8tribunals should the need arise.
Unfortunately, the Tribunals have made a critical jurisprudential error
that has deprived the Genocide Convention, and the Tribunals enacted to
enforce it, of an extremely significant deterrent effect. Under the Genocide
Convention and the Statutes of the ICTR and ICTY, complicity in genocide
is a stand-alone crime, ripe for prosecution. However, recent decisions of
the Tribunals have understandably, but erroneously, determined that
complicity in genocide is merely a form of liability for the crime of
genocide, and not a crime itself.9 The ad hoc Tribunals appear to have
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
5 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Humanitarian LawCommitted in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between 1 January 1994 and
31 December 1994, S.C. Res. 955 (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
6 This much is evident from the decision to incorporate the words "prevention" and
"punishment" in the title of the Genocide Convention. Genocide Convention, supra note 1.
7 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998)
(finding defendant guilty of, inter alia, genocide and direct and public incitement to commit
genocide).
8 The Nuremberg Trials were conducted before the Genocide Convention criminalized
genocide and, thus, were limited jurisdictionally to considerations of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the peace. Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, annex art. VI (Aug. 8, 1945), 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
9 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence
Motions Challenging the Pleading of a Joint Criminal Enterprise in a Count of Complicity in
Genocide in the Amended Indictment, 7 (May 18, 2006) ("[J]urisprudence of both ad hoc
Tribunals has determined that complicity is one of the forms of criminal responsibility that is
applicable to the crime of genocide, and not a crime itself.").
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arrived at this decision through the mistaken conflation of two separate
crimes. The first is the crime of complicity in genocide, as nominated for
punishment in Article 2.3(e) of the ICTR Statute, a substantive crime
provision. The second is the crime of aiding and abetting genocide, as
created by the interplay of Article 2.3(a), also a substantive crime provision,
and Article 6.1, the liability provision.' 0 To arrive at this errant conclusion,
the Tribunals appear to have inferred that complicity in genocide is a
redundant artifact born of the verbatim inclusion of portions of the text of
the Genocide Convention within the ICTY and ICTR Statutes.It
This error is understandable, but critical. The crime of complicity in
genocide captures a class of perpetrators broader than those implicated by
aiding and abetting the crime of genocide. This is a distinction seemingly
recognized by the drafters of the Genocide Convention and of the ICTY and
ICTR Statutes. One found guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of
genocide must have the heightened mens rea of the genocidaire-what I
term the "specific intent specific motive nexus;" by comparison, one who
commits the crime of complicity in genocide need not have this heightened
mens rea. Instead, a lesser mens rea, such as malice evidenced by reckless
disregard, or what I term "specific intent without specific motive," should
suffice to attach guilt. Thus, the two provisions are designed to capture
very different perpetrators. One guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of
genocide had as his very purpose the facilitation of the commission of
genocide. The perpetrator of the crime of complicity in genocide, in
contrast, may not have had genocide as his purpose. Instead, genocide may.
merely have been the foreseeable result of his actions.
10 See, e.g., id.; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Separate Opinion of
Judge Short on Complicity in Genocide and Joint Criminal Enterprise Theory, 5 (May 23,
2006) [hereinafter Separate Opinion of Judge Short] (noting "the contention with respect to
the status of complicity in genocide, mentioned in paragraph 3(e), arises as a result of an
overlap between 'complicity' in Article 2(3)(e) of the Statute and forms of accomplice
liability in Article 6(1) of the Statute"); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-A,
Judgement, 316 (May 20, 2005); Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A,
ICTR-96-17-A, Judgement, 500 (Dec. 13, 2004); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-
A, Judgement, 139 (Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement,
640 (Aug. 2, 2001). Note that Article 6.1 of the ICTR Statute is identical to Article 7.1 of
the ICTY Statute. ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 6.1; ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 7.1.
Additionally, Article 2.3(e) of the ICTR Statute is identical to Article 4.3(e) of the ICTY
Statute. ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 2.3(e); ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 4.3(e). For
purposes of economy, all references to specific articles refer to the Statute of the ICTR.
See, e.g., Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 640:
By incorporating Article 4.3 in the Statute [of the ICTY], the drafters of the Statute ensured
that the Tribunal has jurisdiction over all forms of participation in genocide prohibited under
customary international law. The consequence of this approach, however, is that certain heads of
individual criminal responsibility in Article 4.3 overlap with those in Article 7.1.
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The failure by jurists to appreciate that complicity in genocide is a
stand-alone crime whereas aiding and abetting is merely a form of liability
for the crime of genocide creates a gaping loophole, providing unwarranted
sanctuary to those who commit the crime of complicity in genocide.
Moreover, it signals to would-be facilitators of genocide, whether military
commanders, elected officials, arms dealers, or nations themselves, that
genocidal conduct more often than not goes unpunished. The failure to
hold these players accountable threatens to significantly weaken the
Genocide Convention and the criminal tribunals enacted in its wake. Only
by correcting this jurisprudential error can the "Never Again" ethos of the
Genocide Convention be fully realized.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II introduces the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR with respect to the crimes of
complicity in genocide and of aiding and abetting genocide. Part III
analyzes the Genocide Convention as well as the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals enacted to enforce it. This section describes how and why these
instruments have been misinterpreted and proposes a corrected
interpretation. Part IV reveals that this corrected interpretation might result
in culpability for a broader class of players than current jurisprudence
allows, including political leaders and arms dealers who have plausible
deniability and nations, such as the United States, with interventionist
foreign policies. 12
II. THE CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE VERSUS AIDING AND
ABETTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ICTY
AND ICTR
A. COMPLICITY IN THEORY
Complicity as defined by the Tribunals refers to "all acts of assistance
or encouragement that have substantially contributed to, or have had a
substantial effect on, the completion" of a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. 13 In international criminal law, the three essential elements of
complicity are (1) the commission of a crime; (2) the accomplice's-one
12 The International Court of Justice (ICJ), by virtue of Article 9 of the Genocide
Convention, has jurisdiction to hear cases regarding state responsibility for genocide and its
companion crimes. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 9. The exemplar used below of
the United States is not meant to suggest that U.S. government officials are any more
deserving of prosecution than are the officials of many other nations against whom
complicity in genocide might attach.
13 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on Defence Motions
Challenging the Pleading of a Joint Criminal Enterprise in a Count of Complicity in
Genocide in the Amended Indictment, 6 (May 18, 2006).
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who is complicit-material contribution to the commission of that crime;
and (3) the accomplice's intention that the crime be committed, or the
accomplice's reckless disregard for the potential of its commission. 14 The
elements of this third requirement are referred to in this Article as the mens
rea degrees of "specific intent" and "malice," respectively.
International criminal law provides for the punishment of
accomplices." For instance, the Nuremberg Principles recognize that
complicity in the commission of a crime against humanity or a war crime is
a crime under international law.16 Since the Nuremberg Trials, international
criminal efforts have frequently focused as much on those in leadership
positions, such as Hermann Goring or Julius Streicher17 who are,
technically speaking, just accomplices, 18 as on the physical perpetrators-
those who perform the actual action that results in death or injury to the
victim. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber suggested in reference to this
distinction:
Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal
act.. . the... contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in
facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows then that the moral
gravity of such participation is often no less--or indeed no different-from that ofS • 19
those actually carrying out the acts in question.
Indeed, according to Professor Schabas:
Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation, but when applied to
genocide, there is nothing "secondary" about it. The "accomplice" is often the real
villain, and the "principal offender" a small cog in the machine. Hitler did not,
apparently, physically murder or brutalize anybody; technically, he was "only" an
accomplice to the crime of genocide.
20
14 See William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the
Accomplices, 842 INT'L REv. RED CRoss 439, 446 (2001).
15 Id. at 442-46.
16 Id. "Principle VII: Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war
crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international
law." Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal
and in the Judgment of the Tribunal: Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Second Session, princ. 7, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950), 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 374, 377 (1950), available at http://untreaty.un.org
/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.
17 Hermann Goring was a leading member of the Nazi Party and second in command to
Adolph Hitler during World War II. Julius Streicher was the propaganda minister of the
Nazi Party. He published Der Stdirmer, a weekly Nazi newspaper responsible for the
propagation of anti-Semitic propaganda.
18 See Schabas, supra note 14, at 442-46.
19 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IC-94-1-A, Judgement, 191 (July 15, 1999).
20 See SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 286.
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Nevertheless, Hitler was in every sense the person most responsible for
the Holocaust. Therefore, the drafters of the Genocide Convention
recognized that it was essential to include "a provision authorizing
prosecution for complicity" in order to capture "those who organize, direct
or otherwise encourage genocide but who never actually wield machine
guns or machetes. ' l  In other instances, however, the accomplice to
genocide may be a subsidiary villain and may lack the genocidaire's
specific genocidal intent. Instead, genocide may merely be a foreseeable
result of his actions. That is, the complicity provisions of the Genocide
Convention and the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals appear designed to
capture two very different classes of criminals: those who planned genocide
but did not kill, and those who lacked a genocidal plan, but knew that
genocide was the foreseeable result of their actions.
Unfortunately, giving effect to this important policy at the ad hoc
Tribunals has not been easy or without controversy.
B. COMPLICITY IN PRACTICE
The difficulty with respect to the ICTY and ICTR revolves around a
seeming redundancy contained within the Statutes of the Tribunals. Article
2.3(e)-"Genocide" (a substantive crimes provision)-of the ICTR Statute
nominates for punishment the crime of "complicity in genocide" whereas
Article 6. 1-"Individual Criminal Responsibility" (a liability provision)-
of the ICTR Statute nominates for punishment those who "otherwise aided
and abetted" the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICTR.
Because the phrase aided and abetted is thought to be virtually
indistinguishable from the concept of complicity, 22 the existence in the
same instrument of provisions providing for the punishment both of one
who aids and abets the crime of genocide and of one who commits the
crime of complicity in genocide has confused some jurists at the
Tribunals.23 In response, they have erroneously inferred that the two are
identical, the result of a careless drafting error.24 Others have noted that




22 See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Commentary: Prosecutor v. Akayesu, in 2 ANNOTATED
LEADING CASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 546 (Andr6 Klip and Goran
Sluiter eds., 2001).
23 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgement, 640 (Apr. 19,
2004).
24 Id.
25 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 485 (Sept. 2, 1998):
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Almost a decade ago, the ICTR Trial Chamber attempted to settle this
controversy when it delivered its landmark judgment in the case of
Prosecutor v. Akayesu. There, the court distinguished between aiding and
abetting genocide under Article 6.1 and complicity in genocide under
Article 2.3(e).26 The Akayesu court concluded that aiding and abetting
genocide requires the heightened mens rea of the genocidaire, specific
intent,27 whereas complicity in genocide does not, but, instead, requires a
lesser mens rea such as malice.28  This ruling demonstrates an
understanding that in order to give the widest possible effect to the deterrent
purpose of the Genocide Convention, it is essential to hold liable criminals
possessing these distinct mens rea.
Unfortunately, this approach has been abandoned, and the ICTR and
ICTY appear to no longer distinguish between one who aids and abets the
crime of genocide and one who commits the crime of complicity in
genocide.29 Instead, the ad hoc Tribunals now appear to insist that both one
who aids and abets the crime of genocide and one who commits the crime
of complicity in genocide must possess the heightened specific intent mens
rea of the genocidaire.
30
In the ongoing case of Prosecutor v. Karemera, a case which
represents the latest analysis of this controversy with respect to the ICTR or
the ICTY, the ICTR Trial Chamber announced that the "jurisprudence of
both ad hoc Tribunals has determined that complicity [in genocide] is one
of the forms of criminal responsibility that is applicable to the crime of
The Chamber is consequently of the opinion that when dealing with a person accused of
having aided and abetted in the planning, preparation and execution of genocide, it must be
proven that such a person did have the specific intent to commit genocide, namely that, he or she
acted with the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such; whereas the same requirement is not needed for complicity in genocide.
26 Id.
27 The concept of specific genocidal intent is explored in depth in Part III, infra, and is
referred to throughout as the specific intent specific motive nexus.
28 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 485; see also Larissa Van Den Herik & Elies Van
Sliedregt, Ten Years Later, the Rwanda Tribunal Still Faces Legal Complexities: Some
Comments on the Vagueness of the Indictment, Complicity in Genocide, and the Nexus
Requirement for War Crimes, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 537, 545 (2004) (explaining that the
Akayesu Trial Chamber concluded that a perpetrator can be convicted of "complicity in
genocide" merely if he knew or had reason to know that the principal was acting with
genocidal intent, whereas a conviction for "aiding and abetting" the crime of genocide
requires proof of specific genocidal intent (that is, the specific intent specific motive nexus
introduced below)).
29 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Decision on Defence Motions Challenging the
Pleading of a Joint Criminal Enterprise in a Count of Complicity in Genocide in the
Amended Indictment, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 7 (May 18, 2006).
30 Id.
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genocide, and not a crime itself."3 This decision incorrectly exports the
heightened mens rea of one who aids and abets the crime of genocide onto
one who commits the crime of complicity in genocide. Because the burden
of proof to convict someone of genocide (or of aiding and abetting
genocide) is extraordinarily high,32 it may preclude the conviction of these
particular defendants for any genocidal crime. This decision is tragic for,
like Julius Streicher and Hermann Goring, Karemera and his co-defendants
bear significant responsibility for the genocide perpetrated against the
Tutsis even though they may not have personally murdered anyone. 33 Yet
this decision has a much wider import. Not only does it mean that those
who planned genocide but did not kill are unlikely to be convicted of a
31 Id. However, Judge Short, in his dissent in this case, interpreted the provisions
correctly:
It is clear that the so-called "acts" referred to in Articles 2(3)(a) and (b)--genocide and
conspiracy to commit genocide-are individual crimes. So are "attempt to commit genocide"
and "direct and public incitement to commit genocide[.]"...
The decision of 18 May 2006 found that "complicity is one of the forms of criminal
responsibility applicable to the crime of genocide, and not a crime itself[.]"...
In my view, complicity in genocide has the indicia of a criminal offence .... It is often
charged as an alternative count to the count of genocide... and can result in a finding of guilt for
"complicity in genocide".... In the case of Semanza, for example, the Accused, who was
charged with counts of genocide and complicity in genocide the alternative, was found not guilty
of genocide and convicted of complicity in genocide. It certainly can not be said that the accused
in that case was convicted of a mode of liability. I am therefore of the view that the term
"complicity in genocide" referred to under Article 2(3)(e) is a crime.
Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Separate Opinion of Judge Short, 5-6, 8
(May 23, 2006).
32 See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 70 (Feb. 26). The court
explained that:
[Genocide] requires the establishment of the 'intent to destroy, in whole or in part,... [the
protected] group, as such.' It is not enough to establish ... that deliberate unlawful killings of
members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be established, and is
defined very precisely. It is often referred to as a special or specific intent or dolus
specialis.... It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted because they belong to
that group, that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more is
required. The acts ... must be done with intent to destroy the group as such in whole or in part.
The words 'as such' emphasize that intent to destroy the protected group .... The specific
intent is also to be distinguished from other reasons or motives the perpetrator may have. Great
care must be taken in finding in the facts a sufficiently clear manifestation of that intent.
Id. 187.
33 Edouard Karemera, Mathieu Ngirumpatse, and Joseph Nzirorera, founding members
of the MRND-the political wing of the Hutu Power regime responsible for the genocide-
began meeting over a year before the genocide to plan and prepare for the destruction of the
Tutsi population. See generally Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Amended
Indictment, 24 (Feb. 23, 2005) (detailing the co-defendants' preparation).
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genocidal crime, it also means that those who lacked a genocidal plan, but
knew that genocide was the foreseeable result of their actions, are unlikely
to be convicted of a genocidal crime. This loophole provides undeserved
sanctuary for these genocidal criminals 34 and threatens to defeat the
deterrent force of the Genocide Convention. In order to correct this
misinterpretation, it is necessary to examine first the text of the Genocide
Convention, and then that of the Statutes developed to enforce its
provisions.
III. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE STATUTES OF THE AD HOC
TRIBUNALS
A. COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE AND GENOCIDE ARE SEPARATE CRIMES
UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
Because the ICTY and ICTR exist only within the confines of a
statutorily created judicial universe, in some sense all questions of law
begin and end with the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. However, because,
with respect to the crime of genocide, the Statutes are derived in large part
from the Genocide Convention, one cannot faithfully interpret the later
Statutes without considering the earlier instrument. The Genocide
Convention reads in relevant part as follows:
Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
34 Punishing Karemera and his cohorts for crimes against humanity or war crimes would
severely understate the degree of their criminality. Genocide has been aptly referred to as
the "Crime of Crimes," and by referring to genocidal conduct as anything but genocide-for
instance, as a crime against humanity as it was known at Nuremberg-we diminish the
gravity of the crime. See SCHABAS, supra note 2. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber explained
in Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgement, 37 (Apr. 19, 2004):
The gravity of genocide is reflected in the stringent requirements which must be satisfied
before this conviction is imposed. These requirements... guard against a danger that
convictions for this crime will be imposed lightly. Where these requirements are satisfied,
however, the law must not shy away from referring to the crime committed by its proper name.
[Vol. 98
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(c) Deliberated inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article III: The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article IV: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article
III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals.
35
As a first step toward determining whether complicity in genocide is a
stand-alone crime, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
36
(Vienna Convention) instructs us to search the Genocide Convention for
"its object and purpose" and then to search for the "ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty" in order to achieve this object and purpose.
Regarding the first step, Article I leaves no doubt that the object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention is to "prevent and to punish" the crime
of genocide. 7 Stated another way, the Genocide Convention is designed to
deter genocide by putting would-be perpetrators on notice that participation
in genocide will result in punishment.
With respect to the second step, it is essential to interpret the relevant
terms of the Genocide Convention in a manner that will give effect to its
object and purpose. Four terms are critical to this examination: acts,
crimes, intent, and as such.
i. Acts versus Crimes
The term acts is unfortunately used to convey two distinctly different
meanings within the one document. The first meaning appears in Article II,
the definitional provision that defines both the actus reus and the mens rea
that constitute the crime of genocide: "[G]enocide means any of the
35 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, arts. 1-4.
36 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.1, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions
/1 1 1969.pdf. The Vienna Convention reads in relevant part: "A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id.
37 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
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following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."38  Within this
provision, the term acts refers to the actus reus attendant to the crime of
genocide. These acts-killing members of the group, causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group, etc.,-comprise the sine
qua non of genocide because one must, at a minimum, participate in one of
these proscribed acts to be found guilty of the crime of genocide.
The second meaning of the term acts occurs in Article 11139 and then
throughout the remainder of the Genocide Convention as part of the phrase
"genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. ' ' 4° In these
instances, the word acts refers to the substantive crimes nominated for
punishment by Article III of the Genocide Convention. Substitution of the
word crimes for the word acts would convey the meaning of Article III
appropriately.
In order to understand why acts must mean crimes in this second
instance, consider the following: First, if acts has the same meaning in both
Article II and Article III, there would be no reason for these Articles to exist
separately of one another. If acts means only physical actions, that is, actus
reus, and never crimes, then Article III, now referring to physical actions
rather than substantive crimes, could be subsumed into Article II, the actus
reus provision. Similarly, if acts means only crimes and never physical
actions, then there would be no reason to use acts in Article II. Further
proof is provided by the fact that the drafters of the Genocide Convention
listed genocide in Article III as a punishable act and considered it a crime, a
point emphasized by the decision to refer to the instrument as the
"Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide"
(emphasis added). Thus, acts must mean crimes within Article III. It
follows then that the phrase "genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III" must mean that these other acts, including complicity in
genocide, are crimes rather than liability provisions. 41  This is strong
semantic evidence that the drafters of the Genocide Convention considered
complicity in genocide a stand-alone crime rather than a mere liability
38 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
" Id. art. III.
40 See, e.g., id. art. IV ("Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals.").
41 For more support, recall Judge Short's statement from his separate opinion, supra note
31, the relevant text of which provides: "It is clear that the so-called 'acts' referred to in
Article 2.3 ... are individual crimes." Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T,
Separate Opinion of Judge Short, 5 (May 23, 2006).
[Vol. 98
CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE
provision for the crime of genocide. Further evidence is provided by a
consideration of mens rea.
ii. Genocidal Mens Rea: Specific Intent versus the Specific Intent Specific
Motive Nexus Under the Genocide Convention
The second and third critical terms for interpretation-the word intent
and the seemingly casual phrase as such-are also found within Article II,
the definitional article.42 These provisions within Article II correspond to
the requisite intent and motive of the crime of genocide and, together define
its mens rea. The term intent corresponds to the phrase "the purpose to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,"
and the phrase as such corresponds to the phrase "because it is a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group." These two distinct elements-(1) the
purpose to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group (2) because it is a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group-together constitute the special mens rea requirement of the crime of
genocide.43 For genocidal guilt to attach, the accused must perform the
actus reus of genocide with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical,4 racial, or religious group because it is a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group. In other words, the genocidaire seeks to
destroy a protected group as an end in itself. The destruction, in whole or in
part, of a protected group that is merely a foreseeable consequence of
another purpose-territorial acquisition or financial gain-does not
42 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
43 Some international criminal law scholars address the intent and motive requirements
differently by subsuming both under differing standards of intent. The first standard of
intent is dolus directus, in which the wrongful consequences of the act were both foreseen
and desired by the perpetrator. The second standard of intent is dolus indirectus, in which
certain secondary consequences, in addition to those desired by the perpetrator of the act,
were foreseen by the perpetrator as a certainty. Although the perpetrator did not desire those
collateral consequences, he nevertheless committed the act, and those consequences did
follow. The third standard of intent is dolus eventualis, in which the perpetrator foresaw that
consequences other than those desired were possible, and nevertheless went ahead with the
act. Johan D. Van Der Vyver, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity:
Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 286, 307
(1999).
The concept of dolus directus is substantially similar to the concept of the specific intent
specific motive nexus introduced later in this Article, whereas the concepts of dolus
indirectus and dolus eventualis would apply to one who has specific intent but lacks specific
motive. As such, only dolus directus will satisfy the mens rea requirement of the crime of
genocide proper, whereas dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis will allow guilt to attach for
committing the crime of complicity in genocide but not for aiding and abetting the crime of
genocide.
44 This Article uses the term ethnical rather than the more familiar term ethnic following
the example of the Genocide Convention.
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constitute genocide, but, instead, is complicity in genocide, or a crime
against humanity, or an act of mass murder.
This mens rea requirement is critical because it distinguishes genocide
(and, as explained below, aiding and abetting genocide) from complicity in
genocide, mass murder, or crimes against humanity.45 The international law
refers to the mens rea that results from the union of intent and motive in the
crime of genocide as the dolus specialis requirement. In the context of
genocide, the corresponding English phrase, specific intent, can be
somewhat misleading as it does not alert the reader to the fact that the
phrase refers to the motive component as well. Therefore, this Article uses
the phrase specific intent specific motive nexus to refer to the special mens
rea requirement of the crime of genocide (and aiding and abetting the crime
of genocide).
Is there a practical difference between specific intent and "specific
motive?" There is, and it is critical to our analysis. A pair of examples
illustrates the quite different meanings of the two terms within the
jurisprudence of the ICTR:
(A) Specific Intent with Specific Motive: When in 1994 members of
the Hutu majority in Rwanda killed approximately 800,000 members of the
Tutsi minority because the Tutsi were members of a particular national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, the perpetrators had both specific intent
and specific motive. In other words, their purpose was to eradicate the
Tutsi (intent) because they were Tutsi (motive). In doing so, they satisfied
the specific intent specific motive nexus requirement of the Genocide
Convention (and the Statute of the ICTR) and thereby committed genocide.
(B) Specific Intent without Specific Motive: Had the Hutu majority
instead killed thousands of Tutsi because the Tutsi lived in a fertile region
of Rwanda and the Hutu desired their agricultural resources, they would
have either the mens rea of specific intent without specific motive or the
mens rea of malice. Here, their purpose would be to kill the Tutsi (intent)
not because they were members of a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
group, but because they desired agricultural resources (motive) and, in this
sense, were indifferent to whether their victims were Tutsi or Hutu or even
46 ~ hssNorth Americans. In this scenario, specific intent exists, but specific
45 Indeed, the commentary to the International Law Commission's 1996 Draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind describes the specific intent requirement
of genocide (what I refer to as the specific intent specific motive nexus) as the
"distinguishing characteristic of this particular crime under international law." U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., 6th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/51/10 at 44 (July 26, 1996).
46 Indeed, the Hutu claimed just this in their plea for mitigation:
[T]he Commission of Experts on Rwanda discussed the fact that Hutu activists denied that
their actions had been racially motivated. Instead they said that they had been motivated by
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motive is lacking, as the Hutu are agnostic to the fate of the Tutsi group as a
whole. Thus, in keeping with current ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence, the
perpetrators could be prosecuted for mass murder or crimes against
humanity, but not for committing the crimes of complicity in genocide or
genocide or any genocidal crime. Because genocide has a uniquely terrible
stigma and heightened penalty, the inability to convict the participants
imagined in this scenario for any genocidal crime deprives the Genocide
Convention of a significant deterrent force.
To reiterate, under current ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence, the
perpetrator in example (A), who has specific intent and specific motive can
be prosecuted for genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, and complicity in
genocide. The perpetrator in example (B), who has specific intent without
specific motive, can be successfully prosecuted for crimes against humanity
or mass murder, but not for aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in
genocide, or any other genocidal crime. It is the failure in example (B),
above, to allow successful prosecution of the perpetrators for a genocidal
crime that animates this Article. Scholars have discussed precisely this
weakness in the current jurisprudence of the ICTR.4 7 It is critical to note
that if the interpretation suggested below is adopted, the perpetrator in
example (B) can be successfully prosecuted for committing the crime of
complicity in genocide, but cannot be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the
crime of genocide.
iii. Complicity in Genocide is a Stand-Alone Crime Under the Genocide
Convention
Keeping the above examples in mind, the analysis in this section
considers whether, under the Genocide Convention, complicity in genocide
is a stand-alone crime or merely a mode of liability for the crime of
genocide. If the latter is true, then the crime of complicity in genocide must
have a mens rea requirement identical to that of the crime of genocide. If
the former is true, then the crime of complicity in genocide and the crime of
genocide must have different mens rea requirements.
desire to abort the political aspiration of the rival Tutsi tribe. The Commission of Experts noted
the difficulty in determining whether the violence in Rwanda was motivated by political or racial
animus.
Lippman, Fifty Years Later, supra note 2, at 491. This evidence suggests that a distinction
must be made between the crime of complicity in genocide and the crime of aiding and
abetting genocide in order to facilitate genocide prosecutions.
47 See, e.g., Van Den Herik & Van Sliedregt, supra note 28, at 549 (explaining that
current "complicity doctrine, with its singular distinction between principals and
accomplices, does not allow for [guilt to attach to] an auctor intellectualist with a
perpetrator-like status... [whereas] [c]orrect complicity doctrine circumvents the
requirement of proof of specific intent").
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In order to proceed with this inquiry, it is essential to return once more
to the text of the Genocide Convention. Article II reads in relevant part:
"[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent.., as
such. ' 48  Article III reads in relevant part, "The following acts shall be
punishable: (a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct
and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit
genocide; (e) Complicity in Genocide. 49
The critical point here is that the specific intent specific motive nexus
requirement applies only to the crime of genocide itself and not to the other
crimes listed in Article 111. 50  This is because Article II does not read,
"genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to
commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide
means any of the following acts committed with intent ... as such."
Instead, it reads "[glenocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent ... as such.",
51
Further, one need only consider the exhaustive list of prohibited acts,
including killing members of the group and causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group, without the commission of which
genocide cannot occur, to clarify this point. "Attempt to commit genocide"
is an inchoate crime. Yet to attach liability to the crime of genocide, one of
the discrete actions listed in Article II must be completed. The completion
of any one of the acts will suffice to fulfill the actus reus of genocide. If
Article II is read as applying to all of Article III, attempt to commit
48 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 2 (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., Chile Eboe-Osuji, Complicity in Genocide Versus Aiding and Abetting
Genocide-Construing the Difference in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
56, 63-64 (2005):
The dolus specialis-i.e. the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, as such" stated in Article 2(2)--is indicated only against "genocide." Article
2(2), which prescribes the dolus specialis, does not say that it pertains to "genocide" as well as to
the other crimes listed in Article 2(3) including "complicity in genocide." Nor does Article 2(3),
which contains the list of crimes, say so. Without needing to invoke the expressio unius exclusio
alterius doctrine, it may suffice simply to ask this: What is the legal basis to read this special
intent into the provision of Article 2(3)(e) providing for "complicity in genocide," if there is no
language in the Statute that says so? Surely, this cannot be based on a conception of the dolus
specialis as part of what is known as the "general part" of the law, for the general part in a
criminal statute, such as the Tribunals' Statutes, must contain words to the effect that the
provisions made there are of general application to every other provision or offence in the
statute. There is no such statutory language in either Article 2 of the ICTR Statute or in the
Genocide Convention (1948) on which Article 2 of the Statute is modeled. In the absence of
clear statutory language requiring this special mens rea for Article 2(3)(e), we must then hark
back to the general principles of law of accessorial responsibility and the required mens rea for
it.
5 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 2 (emphasis added).
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genocide, an inchoate crime, is a crime that cannot actually be committed.
In other words, one would actually have to commit one of the five
prohibited elements of the actus reus of genocide-thereby committing
genocide-to be found guilty of the inchoate crime of attempt to commit
genocide. Thus, there would be no reason to list the inchoate crime of
attempt to commit genocide within Article III. This illogical result cannot
have been the intention of the framers of the Genocide Convention. Thus, it
is apparent that Article II applies only to the crime of genocide and not to
the crimes of "conspiracy to commit genocide," complicity in genocide, etc.
This difference is critical. According to the terms of the Genocide
Convention, genocide cannot be committed absent the specific intent
specific motive nexus, but the companion crimes of genocide can. One can
be found guilty of the crime of complicity in genocide without having held
the desire to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group because it is a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.
As a practical matter, the specific intent specific motive nexus will
generally be present in the crimes of conspiracy to commit genocide, "direct
and public incitement to commit genocide," and attempt to commit
genocide. But the specific intent specific motive nexus need not be present
to secure a conviction for any of the companion crimes of genocide. The
absence of this specific intent specific motive nexus requirement within the
crime of complicity in genocide is almost certainly the reason for its
existence. Complicity in genocide ensures that those who commit
genocidal crimes with without specific motive are prosecutable.
52
Surely this must be the correct interpretation of the Genocide
Convention, the object and purpose of which is to "prevent and to punish"
the crime of genocide.53 Indeed, in adapting the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals from the Genocide Convention, the framers of the newer
documents clarified precisely this point.
52 Alexander Greenawalt proposes a substantially similar dual track analysis for
analyzing the specific intent requirement. Alexander Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal
Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation, 99 COL. L. REv. 2259, 2259 (1999).
Greenawalt argues that although "genocide is generally interpreted as a crime of special
intent... principal culpability for genocide should extend to those who may personally lack
a specific genocidal purpose, but who commit genocidal acts while understanding the
destructive consequences of their actions." Id. While this Article shares his view of the
problem, it proposes a different solution. Rather than remove the specific intent specific
motive nexus requirement, which would invite charges of judicial legislation, this Article
suggests that the crime of complicity in genocide suffices to capture those perpetrators who
satisfy the specific intent requirement although they do not satisfy the specific intent specific
motive nexus requirement. In those instances in which the specific intent specific motive
nexus requirement is satisfied, aiding and abetting genocide would be the appropriate charge.
53 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 1.
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B. COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE AND GENOCIDE ARE SEPARATE CRIMES
UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS
In 1993, the drafters of the ICTY Statute54 picked up where the framers
of the Genocide Convention had left off some forty-five years before. The
ICTY and ICTR Statutes are based in large part on the Genocide
Convention. Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention are reproduced
verbatim within the later documents. This is no surprise given that the
Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals were designed, like the Genocide
Convention before them, to punish and deter genocide. There is, however,
a critical addition to the text of the Genocide Convention within the later
instruments. This addition, Article 6, serves to emphasize that complicity
in genocide is a stand-alone crime. The ICTR Statute reads in relevant part
as follows:
Article 2: Genocide
1: The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute
persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of
committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2: Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberated inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3: The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Article 6: Individual Criminal Responsibility
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles
2 to 4 of the present Statute, shall be individually criminally responsible for the
crime.
14 The ICTY and ICTR Statutes are identical in all relevant aspects save numbering.
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3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in Article 2 to 4 of the present Statute
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
55
Although the ICTR and the ICTY Statutes lack preambles, the texts
leave little doubt that the object and purpose of the Statutes is to deter the
crime of genocide and to punish those guilty of its commission. Thus, in
fidelity to the Vienna Convention, the text of the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals must be interpreted in a manner that allows punishment to a
degree sufficient to deter the crimes listed within the Statutes. Once again,
the critical terms for interpretation are acts, intent, and as such.
i. Acts Versus Crimes
As in the Genocide Convention, the term acts is used within the ICTR
Statute in two distinct manners. In Article 2.1 of the Statute, acts is used as
a substitute for the word crimes. This is the predominant meaning of the
term acts throughout the ICTR Statute. The logic behind the determination
that acts in these instances means crimes is identical to the logic underlying
the same determination in the Genocide Convention. However, because the
drafters of the ICTR Statute employed the word acts as a substitute for the
word crimes in several additional Articles beyond those contained in the
Genocide Convention, we briefly consider one of these instances here.
Article 6.1 reads in relevant part: "A person who. . . committed.., a
crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4, shall be individually responsible for the
crime. 56 Article 6.3 reads in relevant part: "The fact that any of the acts
referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility .... In terms of purpose, the sole relevant difference
between Articles 6.1 and 6.3, both of which are liability provisions, is that
the former refers to non-command-responsibility liability while the latter
refers to command-responsibility liability. Given that each liability
provision is structured similarly, is contained within the same Article, and is
subservient to the same Articles (Articles 2-4), the word acts in Article 6.3
55 ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 2.1-2.3, 6.1, 6.3. It should be noted that the "ICTR
defines aiding as 'giving assistance to someone' and abetting as 'facilitating the commission
of a crime by being sympathetic thereto."' Katharine Orlovsky, International Criminal Law:
Towards New Solutions in the Fight Against Illegal Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 343, 359 (2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T,
Judgement, 484 (Sept. 2, 1998)).
56 ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art. 6.1.
17 Id. art. 6.3.
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must share its meaning with the word crime in Article 6.1. Because
criminal liability accrues to perpetrators of crimes, not ordinary actions, and
because Article 6 is by its very title a liability provision, both terms should
be read as meaning crimes, rather than acts.
Thus, as in the Genocide Convention, the term acts is, with only the
single exception of the actus reus provision, used here as a substitute for the
word crimes. It follows then that when Article 2.3 lists both genocide and
complicity in genocide as punishable acts, they are intended as distinct
punishable crimes. This is further evidence that complicity in genocide is a
crime in itself, not a liability provision for the separate crime of genocide.
ii. Genocidal Mens Rea: Specific Intent versus the Specific Intent Specific
Motive Nexus Under the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals
As in the Genocide Convention, the second and third critical terms for
interpretation within the ICTR Statute are the word intent and the phrase as
such.58 Both are found in Article 2.2, the definitional paragraph. Once
again, this paragraph serves to establish both the actus reus and the mens
rea that are the foundational requirements of the crime of genocide. With
respect to mens rea, the point to be gleaned from this provision is identical
to that of the implicated provision in the Genocide Convention. Genocide
cannot be committed absent the specific intent specific motive nexus, but
those crimes such as complicity in genocide and conspiracy to commit
genocide require only specific intent without specific motive or malice (as
evidenced by reckless disregard) for successful prosecution. The differing
mens rea requirements for the crimes of genocide and complicity in
genocide serve to ensure that liability is broad enough to attach to those
who bear responsibility for a genocidal crime even though they may lack
the specific intent specific motive nexus that is a pre-requisite for successful
prosecution of genocide (or, as explained below, for aiding and abetting
genocide). At the same time, by still requiring specific intent without
specific motive or malice to successfully prosecute the crime of complicity
in genocide, the liability threshold is set sufficiently high that those without
appropriate culpability are not subject to punishment.
iii. Complicity in Genocide is a Stand-Alone Crime Under the Statutes of
the Ad Hoc Tribunals
The process of determining that genocide and complicity in genocide
have distinct mens rea under the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals is identical
to the process employed above to make the same determination with respect
to the Genocide Convention. Having established that complicity in
" Id. art. 2.2.
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genocide and genocide are distinct crimes under both the Statutes of the ad
hoc Tribunals and the Genocide Convention, it is now possible to consider
whether there is a meaningful difference between the crime of complicity in
genocide and the crime of aiding and abetting genocide.
C. COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE IS DISTINCT FROM AIDING AND
ABETTING GENOCIDE
Article IV of the Genocide Convention reads as follows: "Persons
committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall
be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals."5 9 This is the liability provision, and within
the Genocide Convention, liability only attaches to those who commit the
crimes of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, or complicity
in genocide. The drafters of the ICTR chose quite different terminology for
the basic liability provision, perhaps fearing that successful prosecutions of
those who perpetrate the crimes listed within the ICTR Statute might be
dependent on ambiguities in the definition of the word committing or on
whether a perpetrator's participation rose to the level of committing. Under
Article 6.1 of the ICTR Statute, liability attaches to those who "planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to 4
of the present Statute. 6° Consequently, liability attaches to those whose
behavior arguably may not rise to the definitional standard of committing.
This allows for broader culpability than is provided by the Genocide
Convention.
It is this very liability provision, through its inclusion of the phrase
"aiding and abetting," that has led to interpretive difficulties for the ad hoc
Tribunals. These difficulties have led some jurists to argue that a
redundancy exists between the liability provision of aiding and abetting
genocide, as nominated by the interplay of Articles 6.1 and 2.3(a), and the
crime of complicity in genocide, as nominated by Article 2.3(e). 6' The
explanation offered is that this seeming redundancy is merely the result of a
drafting oversight and of the careless verbatim inclusion of several Articles
of the Genocide Convention.62
59 Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
60 ICTR Statute, supra note 5, art 6.1.
61 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-T, Separate Opinion of Judge
Short, 5 (May 23, 2006).




This argument is difficult to accept. The supposed redundancy is
apparent to any careful reader of the entire ICTR Statute. Thus, the
interpreter is faced with three possibilities, two of which merit rejection.
The first possibility is that the drafters of the ICTR Statute were so careless
that in including Article III of the Genocide Convention verbatim, they
failed to notice that complicity in genocide was a listed crime. The near
universal familiarity with the Genocide Convention along with the fact that
the framers proposed multiple drafts of the ICTY Statute before it was even
appropriated for use as the ICTR Statute make this suggestion untenable.63
The second possibility is that in choosing to construct a liability provision
in a manner different from that provided in the Genocide Convention, the
drafters failed to recognize that aiding and abetting has a meaning identical
to complicity. There are two problems with this suggestion. First, given the
ubiquity of the two concepts, it is unlikely that the drafters were unaware of
the similarity of meaning.64 Second, in importing verbatim both Articles II
and III from the Genocide Convention, but replacing Article IV of the
Genocide Convention with Article 6.1 of the ICTR Statute, the drafters of
the latter instrument signaled that they were satisfied with the crimes
nominated by the Genocide Convention, including complicity in genocide,
but dissatisfied with the attendant liability provisions. Were this not the
case, the drafters simply would have imported Article IV verbatim in
keeping with the practice adopted for Articles II and III, or they would have
rewritten Article III without including the crime of complicity in genocide.
The third proposition, that Article III was purposefully transported
verbatim from the Genocide Convention to the ICTR Statute and that
Article IV of the Genocide Convention was reformulated as Article 6.1 of
the ICTR Statute in order to address the perceived shortcomings of the
63 This proposition becomes even more unlikely when one considers that, according to
the legislative history of the ICTY Statute, there was a "general agreement that ... [the]
definition [of genocide] should conform to the text in the Genocide Convention." This was
because "the part of conventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt
become part of international customary law is the law applicable ... as embodied in" the
Genocide Convention. SCHABAS, supra note 2, at 98-99 (quoting The Report of the
Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993)).
64 Indeed, Professor Schabas, in referring to this supposed redundancy, states that:
These are cognate if not totally identical concepts .. aiding and abetting ... is a classic
common law formulation of complicity.... [The Trial Chamber in Akayesu] asserts a
distinction between aiding and abetting in 6.1 and complicity in genocide in 2.3(e). This is hard
to understand because in comparative criminal law, the two mean essentially the same thing.
Schabas, supra note 22, at 539-40.
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Convention, is the only logical explanation for the alleged redundancy.
65
As an initial matter, this interpretation adheres to the seminal rule of
international legal statutory construction that implores jurists to give
reasonable meaning to the text of a statute rather than reading the text in
such a way that leads to redundancy between provisions. Far more
significantly, there actually is no redundancy to be accounted for because
the two crimes at issue are distinct. ICTR Article 2.3(e) nominates a crime
known as complicity in genocide for which liability attaches through, inter
alia, committing. By contrast, ICTR Article 2.3(a) nominates a crime
called genocide for which liability attaches, through, inter alia, aiding and
abetting. Consequently, under the ICTR Statute an individual can be
prosecuted for committing the crime of complicity in genocide and for
aiding and abetting the crime of genocide.
The difference between the two is vast. To successfully prosecute an
alleged perpetrator for aiding and abetting the crime of genocide under
Articles 6.1 and 2.3(a) of the ICTR Statute, the alleged perpetrator must
possess the specific intent specific motive nexus that is the sine qua non of
the crime of genocide. However, to be found guilty of committing the
crime of complicity in genocide under Articles 6.1 and 2.3(e) of the ICTR
Statute, the alleged perpetrator need only possess a lesser mens rea such as
specific intent without specific motive or malice. In other words, an
individual found guilty of committing the crime of complicity in genocide
has knowledge, or has recklessly disregarded knowledge, that his actions
will assist in the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical,
racial, or religious group. The perpetrator pursues his actions, not because
65 The 1978 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Genocide concluded that the
"[Genocide] Convention failed to adopt effective international measures to prevent and
punish genocide." Lippman, 1948 Convention, supra note 2, at 73-74. In Lippman's 1998
study, he explains:
The 1985 report [of the Special Rapporteur on Genocide] reached a similar conclusion
determining that[:]
[A]II too much evidence continues to accumulate that acts of genocide are still being
committed in various parts of the world .... In its present form, the Convention... [m]ust
be judged to be inadequate. Further evolution of international measures against genocide are
necessary and indeed overdue.
This report recommends that additional measures should be incorporated into a supplementary
convention or protocol.
Id. at 463-64. Indeed, Lippman explains that critics complain that the specific intent specific
motive nexus requirement permits those who commit genocide to claim that they lacked the
required mens rea to exterminate the group, which allows them to escape punishment. Id. at
464. Lippman's proposal to address this situation is for a secondary form of liability that
encompasses the "negligent" destruction of a group. Id. This Article suggests that such a
provision already exists within the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals and the Genocide
Convention, namely, the crime of complicity in genocide.
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of the victims' status, but because this action may result in economic profit
or territorial or political gain or for any other non-specific motive. In
contrast, the perpetrator found guilty of aiding and abetting the crime of
genocide assists in the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group because the victims are members of the
particular group. These differing mens rea are in keeping with the object
and purpose of the ICTR Statute to spread liability broadly enough to deter
the commission of the crimes listed within the Statute without capturing
those who are not deserving of punishment.66
Was there any need to include the aiding and abetting provision within
Article 6.1? That is, can it be said that the aiding and abetting liability
provision is redundant? After all, would not one who satisfies the mens rea
requirement of aiding and abetting the crime of genocide exceed the mens
rea requirement of the crime of complicity in genocide, thereby permitting
guilt to attach for that crime as well? Although the answer is yes, two notes
are important. First, as discussed above, one with specific intent who lacks
specific motive can be prosecuted for committing the crime of complicity in
genocide, but not for aiding and abetting genocide. Second, Article 6.1
applies to each and every crime within the jurisdiction of the ICTR Statute.
Thus, in addition to serving as a liability provision for the crime of
genocide, Article 6.1 is a liability provision for Article 3 (Crimes against
Humanity) and Article 4 (Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II). In contrast to Article 2, neither
Article 3 nor Article 4 standing alone provide for accomplice liability.
Thus, without Article 6.1, those who merely planned, instigated, or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a
crime referred to in Articles 3 or 4-that is, those whose participation did
not rise to the level of committing or ordering to be committed-could not
be successfully prosecuted. Article 2, in contrast, explicitly provides for the
punishment of those who commit crimes of arguably attenuated liability
66 Indeed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has supported this very proposition by explaining
that:
An interpretation of the Statute based on its object and purpose leads to the conclusion that the
Statute intends to extend the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal to all those 'responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law' committed in the former Yugoslavia
(Article 1). As is apparent from the wording of both Article 7(1) and the provisions setting forth
the crimes over which the International Tribunal has jurisdiction (Articles 2 to 5), such
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law is not limited merely to
those who actually carry out the actus reus of the enumerated crimes but appears to extend also
to other offenders (see in particular Article 2, which refers to committing or ordering to be
committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Article 4 which sets forth various
types of offences in relation to genocide, including conspiracy, incitement, attempt and
complicity.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. ICTY 94-1-A, Judgement, 189 (July 15, 1999).
[Vol. 98
CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE
such as conspiracy to commit genocide and complicity in genocide, and
thus directly provides for punishment without reliance on Article 6.1.
IV. AN IMPORTANT APPLICATION FOR THE CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN
GENOCIDE: EXPANDED LIABILITY FOR POLITICAL LEADERS,
ARMS TRAFFICKERS, AND STATES
Having now established that complicity in genocide is a stand-alone
crime, distinct from aiding and abetting genocide and with a reduced mens
rea, it is now possible to consider to what use this corrected interpretation
might be put.
It was suggested above that a correct interpretation of complicity in
genocide might result in liability for political leaders who plan or facilitate
the commission of genocide, but for whom hard proof of the requisite
specific intent specific motive nexus is lacking. For instance, Edouard
Karemera and his co-defendants Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Joseph
Nzirorera, founding members of the MRND, the political wing of the Hutu
Power regime, were almost certainly instrumental in facilitating the
Rwandan genocide.6 7  Following the assassination of President
Habyarimana, the defendants allegedly assumed power and employed the
apparatus of the Hutu Power state they established to execute their
meticulously planned destruction of the Tutsis. Karemera, as Minister of
the Interior, allegedly distributed weapons to the Interahamwe, the
genocidal youth militia founded in 1992 by Ngirumpatse. Ngirumpatse
allegedly founded a hate radio station, RTLM, employed to disseminate
Hutu Power ideology and exhort the Interahamwe and other adherents of
the Hutu Power regime to exterminate the Tutsi. Nzirorera allegedly
collaborated with the other two defendants to institute a program of
"civilian self defense" encouraging Hutu civilians to cooperate with the
Hutu military in the eradication of Tutsi civilians.
Like their Nazi predecessors, Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera
almost certainly bear significant responsibility for genocide though they did
not, as far as we know, actually kill anyone. However, because the
defendants carefully concealed their genocidal intent under a guise of
plausible deniability provided by Hutu pride, military objective, and civilian
self-defense, the prosecution may be unable to establish the existence of the
specific intent specific motive nexus required to find them guilty of
genocide. 68  Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera seem ripe for
67 The following factual discussion is drawn from the ICTR's indictment of Karemera.





prosecution for committing the crime of complicity in genocide, where the
specific intent specific motive nexus need not be established. As explained
above, specific intent without specific motive or, alternatively, malice as
evidenced by reckless disregard is sufficient to establish culpability. Yet,
unless the jurisprudential error of the ad hoc Tribunals is corrected, these
defendants, who may bear some of the greatest culpability for the
devastating Rwandan genocide, may not be convicted of any genocidal
69crime.
Correcting the jurisprudential error could provide for the conviction of
Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera. In international criminal law, the
three basic requirements for establishing complicity are (1) a crime must
have been committed; (2) the accomplice-one who is complicit-must
have contributed in a material way to the commission of that crime; and (3)
the accomplice must have intended that the crime be committed or have
been reckless as to its commission.70 Here, there is little question that the
crime was committed and there is little doubt that the accomplices
contributed in a material way to its commission. The issue of culpability,
therefore, revolves around the third step, whether the accomplices had the
requisite mens rea. While it is likely that Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and
Nzirorera intended the genocidal result of their actions, it is by no means
certain that the prosecution could establish this. There is, however, little
doubt that Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera at the very least
recklessly disregarded the fact that genocide might result from their
activities. Assuming that complicity in genocide requires only the mens rea
of specific intent without specific motive or that of malice as evidenced by
reckless knowledge, Karemera, Ngirumpatse, and Nzirorera could be
convicted of the crime of complicity in genocide, whereas they might not be
successfully prosecuted for genocide or aiding and abetting genocide.
A second application for a corrected interpretation of the crime of
complicity in genocide revolves around the culpability of international arms
traders who are often the very lifeblood of genocide.7 1 Take, for instance,
the fictional example of an apolitical Zairean (now Congolese) arms broker
with one Tutsi parent and one Hutu parent who, in violation of the U.N.
arms embargo forbidding arms sales to Rwanda during 1994, supplied two
million machetes to Rwandan militia forces during the second month of the
69 Punishing Karemera and his cohorts for crimes against humanity or war crimes would
severely understate the degree of their criminality and would serve to weaken the deterrent
effect of the Genocide Convention. See supra note 34.
70 See Schabas, supra note 14, at 446.
71 See e.g., Katharine Orlovsky, International Criminal Law: Towards New Solutions in
the Fight Against Illegal Arms Brokers, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 343, 350-52
(2006) (discussing black market arms in the context of the Rwandan genocide).
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genocide. Within days of the assassination of President Habyarimana,
international news reports, running around the clock, described in gruesome
detail how members of the Hutu majority were using machetes to
dismember members of the Tutsi minority.7 2 Given the widespread
knowledge of the genocide, it must be assumed that the arms broker had
knew of the tragedy unfolding in neighboring Rwanda, yet went ahead with
the sale of the machetes to the Hutu Power regime hoping to make a
handsome profit.73 Thus, the arms dealer had the specific intent to commit
genocide in that he knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that his sale
would facilitate the deaths of thousands of Tutsis.
However, such a perpetrator cannot be successfully prosecuted for
aiding and abetting genocide because he lacked the specific motive to
destroy the Tutsis because they were members of a national, religious,
ethnical, or religious group. In this case, his motive was merely to make a
profit, and indeed, being half-Tutsi himself, the fictional arms broker
probably would prefer his machetes to be used for agricultural purposes.
He cannot be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit genocide because an
arms broker simply looking to make a profit probably would not go through
the trouble of planning a massive international crime merely to accomplish
that goal. He cannot be prosecuted for attempt to commit genocide because
attempt is an inchoate crime. Nor can he be prosecuted for direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, as those in the business of illegal
arms trading in violation of an international embargo generally do not
broadcast their involvement. Thus, without the crime of complicity in
genocide, this man, who significantly facilitated the commission of
genocide in Rwanda, whether intentionally or with criminal recklessness, is
72 See, e.g., The United Human Rights Council, Genocide in Rwanda,
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/Genocide/genocide in-rwanda.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2008).
73 Cf Schabas, supra note 14, at 450-51. Professor Schabas explains:
In domestic criminal law, the knowledge requirement is usually the linchpin of the case. This
is because accomplices provide assistance that is ostensibly ambiguous in nature, and because if
the criminal is acting on an individual and generally isolated basis it may seem unlikely that the
accomplice is aware of his or her intentions. For example, there will often be considerable doubt
as to whether the gun merchant actually knows the firearm being sold will be used to effect a
bank robbery ... However with regard to violations of international humanitarian law,
establishing knowledge of the end use should generally be less difficult because... given the
intense publicity about war crimes and other atrocities.., made known not only.., by the
United Nations and non-governmental-organizations, but also by the popular media, a court
ought to have little difficulty in concluding that diamond traders, airline pilots and executives,




unavailable for prosecution under the Genocide Convention or the Statutes
of the ad hoc Tribunals.
This hypothetical is hardly far-fetched: Victor Anatolyevich Bout
(a.k.a. "The Merchant of Death"), one of the world's most prolific arms
dealers, was arrested in March of 2008 by U.S. and Thai authorities.74 Bout
is accused of supplying arms on a massive scale to such genocide-tom
regions as Sudan.75 If the jurisprudential error identified by this Article is
corrected, Bout's deadly profiteering might render him culpable for the
crime of complicity in genocide.
An equally powerful application for the corrected interpretation
advocated here is in assigning State responsibility for the commission of
genocide. A case in point is the potential responsibility of the United States
for complicity in genocide with respect to Iraq. 6
Since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the concomitant removal of
Saddam Hussein from power, dramatic sectarian violence has wreaked
havoc in Iraq.77 While estimates of the civilian death toll since March 2003
range from 100,000 to 1,000,000,7 the most commonly accepted figure as
of August 2008 appears to be approximately 90,000 deaths.79 It appears
that the vast majority of these civilian deaths are attributable to sectarian
violence rather than to traditional military operations.80
In response, a variety of American political, military, and human rights
leaders have cautioned against a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq lest
genocide result.81  Others have suggested that genocide may already be
74 See Victor Bout News, N. Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference
/timestopics/people/b/victor bout/index.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
75 Id.
76 The International Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear cases regarding genocide and
its companion crimes. Genocide Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
77 See generally JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY
FORWARD-A NEW APPROACH (2006) [hereinafter IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT] (assessing
the state of the war in Iraq per Congressional mandate).
78 See G. Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional
Cluster Sample Survey, 368 THE LANCET 9545, 1421-28 (2004); Lawrence K. Altman &
Richard A. Oppel, W.H.O. Says Iraq Civilian Death Toll Higher Than Cited, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2008, at A14; Jonathan Steele & Suzanne Goldenberg, What is the Real Death Toll
in Iraq? GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 19, 2008, at 6.
79 See, e.g., Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
80 See IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 77, at 4.
81 Independent Senator Joe Lieberman has predicted that there will be "ethnic cleansing
on an enormous scale" if American forces withdraw from Iraq. See David Scheffer, The
Responsibility To Protect in Iraq: Re-Deploying To Save Lives, THE JURIST, Jan. 30, 2007,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/01/responsibility-to-protect-in-iraq-re.php.
Additionally, Professor Gregory Stanton "sees in Iraq the same troubling signs of
preparation and execution of genocidal aims that he saw in the 1990s in Rwanda when he
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taking place in Iraq, provoked in part by the U.S. military occupation, and
that withdrawal is the solution.82  No matter which view is correct, the
question is twofold. First, are the conditions in Iraq currently, or will they
become following withdrawal, such that it can be said that genocide is or
will be occurring in Iraq? Second, if the answer to the first question is in
the affirmative, does the United States bear responsibility for this genocide,
and if so, to what degree?
In order for liability to attach for complicity in genocide, the crime of
genocide itself must be committed. Given the requirements of genocide
outlined above, namely, that an element of the actus reus of the crime of
genocide needs to have been committed with the specific intent specific
motive nexus, it is likely that any sectarian slaughter would qualify as
genocide. This is so because the actus reus would be satisfied by the killing
of members of a protected group, the Sunni Iraqis. The mens rea would be
satisfied because the Shia would be targeting the Sunni because they were
Sunni rather than because they were an impediment to economic growth or
because of any other non-specific motive.
Indeed, the situation in Iraq parallels to a striking degree the situation
that existed in Rwanda prior to the 1994 genocide. The members of a long-
oppressed majority have assumed power at the expense of a formerly
powerful minority and have undertaken a campaign of reprisal killings.
The only significant distinctions are, first, that the tensions in Iraq are
motivated by religious differences rather than tribal differences and, second,
that the recently empowered group in Iraq is backed by the United States to
worked at the State Department ... and his organization, Genocide Watch, is preparing to
declare the country a genocide emergency." Massimo Calabresi, Is Iraq Headed for
Genocide?, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 29, 2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/world
/article/0,8599,1564270,00.html.
As Calabresi explains, Professor Samantha Power has concluded that:
[T]he necessary specific intent is already in evidence in Iraq and that preparations for genocide
are underway: "When you drive up to a checkpoint and you're stopped and somebody pulls out
your ID and determines whether you're a Sunni or a Shiite and takes you away and kills you
because of that, there is a genocidal mentality afoot."
Id.
82 For instance, the Iraq Study Group Report warns that: "in some parts of Iraq-notably
in Baghdad-sectarian cleansing is taking place." IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note
77, at 10. Professor Scheffer has concluded that the Bush Administration's rationale for
staying in Iraq is fallacious because "the civilian death count from violence now rates Iraq as
an atrocity zone." See Scheffer, supra note 81. Indeed, journalist Nicholas Kristof "doubt[s]
President Bush's premise that a buildup is necessarily the best way to avoid a
cataclysm .... [I]f our aim is to avoid catastrophic bloodshed in Iraq, it may well be that
we're more likely to accomplish that by leaving rather than staying." Nicholas D. Kristof,
Iraqis Show Us the Door, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2007, at A23.
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a far greater extent than the Hutu in Rwanda were backed by any foreign
power.
If genocide is either occurring or is likely to occur in Iraq, could the
United States could be found liable for the crime of complicity in genocide?
Once again, the familiar accomplice matrix is implicated. In this example,
if the Shiite majority were to commit genocide, the first element, the
commission of a crime, would be satisfied. The United States' invasion of
Iraq and failure to sufficiently protect the newly disempowered Sunni
majority would constitute a material contribution to the crime by the
accomplice, thereby satisfying the second element.83 The only question
remaining would be whether the United States possessed the specific intent
without specific motive or malice as evidenced by reckless knowledge
necessary to satisfy the mens rea requirement of the crime of complicity in
genocide.
The answer, unfortunately, may be in the affirmative. Of course, there
is no suggestion that the United States possesses the specific intent specific
motive nexus in the sense that the government desires the destruction of the
Sunni minority. The opposite is certainly true. But specific intent is not the
requisite mens rea with respect to the crime of complicity in genocide.
Instead, a lesser mens rea such as specific intent without specific motive or
malice is sufficient to attach liability for the crime of complicity in
genocide. Given the constant media coverage of the sectarian killings in
Iraq and the repeated acknowledgements of such by prominent U.S.
politicians, including President George W. Bush,84 a strong case can be
made that the United States knows of the genocidal intent of those it aids or,
at the very least, recklessly disregards knowledge of their genocidal intent.
The crime of complicity in genocide, in keeping with the object and
purpose of the Genocide Convention and the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals, allows prosecutions of those who commit or facilitate genocidal
crimes with specific intent even though they may lack specific motive. The
drafters of the Genocide Convention and the Statutes of the ad hoc
Tribunals intended to ensure that those without the specific intent specific
motive nexus could still be prosecuted for committing the crime of
complicity in genocide as long as the perpetrators have the requisite specific
intent without specific motive or malice. As such, it is quite possible that
83 In fact, the ICJ recently held in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia that failure to prevent
genocide is itself a separate ground for imputing State liability under the Genocide
Convention: "In particular, the Contracting Parties have a direct obligation to prevent
genocide." Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 70, 165 (Feb. 26).
84 See, e.g., Bush Acknowledges Setbacks in Iraq, CNN.CoM, Oct. 25, 2006
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/25/stay.course/index.html.
950 [Vol. 98
CRIME OF COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE
the United States would be found guilty of committing the crime of
complicity in genocide were it to be prosecuted at the ICJ under Article IX
of the Genocide Convention. The United States has established the
conditions that make the genocide possible, provided the requisite material
support to the would-be genocidaires, and has knowledge of, or recklessly
disregards knowledge of, their genocidal intent.
The intention of this Article is not to advocate such a prosecution. It is
instead to increase awareness that the possibility of such a prosecution
exists in the hope that this knowledge might be sufficient to deter state
conduct that facilitates the commission of genocide. In the case of Iraq, the
United States may need to take positive steps immediately to protect Iraqi
citizens from genocide and to protect itself from prosecution for complicity
in genocide. A variety of proposals to do so already exist. For example,
Professor Scheffer makes a strong argument for immediate redeployment of
U.S. forces to "on-the-horizon" and "over-the-horizon" positions in Iraq.
85
According to Scheffer, this would allow United States forces to disengage
from provocative urban combat that may contribute to conditions enabling
genocide and instead stand ready to intervene to prevent genocidal atrocities
if they do occur.86 Senator Biden has suggested that the United States
immediately carve Iraq into three semi-autonomous provinces (Shiite,
Sunni, and Kurdish), each capable of self-defense, in order to avoid the
possibility of genocide. 87 Undoubtedly, other solutions exist. But the
purpose of this Article is not to recommend a course of action to take in
Iraq. Instead, it is merely to explain that action must be taken immediately
lest the world watch as yet another genocide occurs-this time a genocide
that might have dire legal consequences for the United States and its
officials for the crime of complicity in genocide.
V. CONCLUSION
The crime of complicity in genocide exists to punish those who
contribute in a material way to the commission of genocide, but who,
because they lack the specific intent specific motive nexus, cannot be
successfully prosecuted for aiding and abetting the crime of genocide.
Although it may be possible to convict one who would otherwise be guilty
of complicity in genocide for aiding and abetting a crime against humanity
under the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, this conviction understates the
perpetrator's degree of guilt and undermines the unique condemnation
85 See Scheffer, supra note 81.
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden & Leslie H. Gelb, Unity Through Autonomy in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 1, 2006, at A19.
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society has reserved for the genocidaire. As a result, an important
deterrence mechanism is lost. In order to punish and deter the crime of
genocide in fidelity to the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention
and the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, complicity in genocide must be
recognized as a stand-alone crime. Only by extending liability to the
political actors, arms brokers, and States that facilitate genocide can the
promises of the Genocide Convention be fulfilled.
